소개글
GM과 Fisher Body사의 장기계약에 있어서 소위 `강탈`이 있었는지 있었다면 어떤 이유에서 인지를 거래비용과 계약조건 등을 고려해 쓴 에세이 입니다.
목차
Introduction
Hold up General Motor?
Define Asset specific and transaction cost
What is Transaction Cost?
1. Business deals and transaction cost theory
2. Analysis of the transaction cost between GM and Fisher Body
Classification of transaction cost and the relation of asset-specific and hold up
The contract of the two companies in perspective of Coase and Klein’s opinion
Conclusion
본문내용
In the relation of ‘A’-‘B’, there are some occasions when the firms come under ‘B’ have to make an investment to the asset only for the transaction with particular ‘A’. The asset which is invested for the transaction with certain firms by the supplier is called ‘Relationship-specific Asset’ (Williamson, 1986). The reason of Fisher Body’s agony about whether or not to supply the roof and body of the car to GM which was supposed to produce the first luxurious car named Cadillac with the roof in the time when the ‘Model T’ which is a distribution model of Ford is all over the place in the vehicle market of America in 1920s, was because of this ‘Relationship-specific Asset.’
As you suspected, for the supply to the GM, massive investment is needed. However, there was no firm which produces the car of which body is integrated with the roof at that time. So, once the investment is made, Fisher Body would obviously bond to the transaction with GM. When ‘B’ made investment for the transaction with ‘A’, ‘A’ demands the renegotiation to lower the cost, and ‘B’ has no choice but lower the cost, that is, so called ‘hold-up’ phenomena is predicted (Klein, 2007). Therefore, supplier avoids this kind of investments which lower their negotiability as much as possible.
참고 자료
Bibliography
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