게임이론이 국제 환경정책의 이해에 주는 시사점

소개글

"게임이론이 국제환경정책 이해에 주는 시사점을 비판적으로 논하시오" (Critically discuss the insights provided by the body of knowledge known as game theory to the understanding of international environmental policy)라는 주제에 대한 에세이입니다.

게임이론이 국제 환경정책을 이해하는 데 기여할 수 있는 측면과 그 한계를 균형있게 서술하였습니다.

에세이는 영어로 작성되었습니다.

목차

I. Introduction: background

II. Body
1. Conceptual linkage : international environmental policy and game theory

2. Contributions of game theory to the study of international environmental policy
(1) Individual rationality and global ineffective outcome: highlights the need of cooperation
(2) Clarification of the main issue of problem
(3) Methodological advantage

3. Limitations of game theory in the study of international environmental policy
(1) Agent: an agent acting upon limited scope of variables
(2) Context: lack of international and domestic political context
(3) Issue : ignorance of characteristics of environmental problem - uncertainty and irreversibility

III. Conclusion

본문내용

Question: Critically discuss the insights provided by the body of knowledge known as game theory to the understanding of international environmental policy

(......) The study of international environmental policy has attracted the interest of many scholars and policy-makers, including those who study game theory. While game theory is thought to be a useful frame analysing interactions over environmental problems, it is often criticized that the theory is highly abstract and assuming too much about the rationality of actors (Finus 2008:30).
Against this backdrop, this essay aims to critically examine both insights and limitations brought by game theory to global environmental policy.
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참고 자료

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